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PROTECTION OF A DEBTOR'S "FRESH
START" UNDER THE NEW
BANKRUPTCY CODE*
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Code)' signals a major shift in the
traditional balance between debtors' and creditors' interests in bankruptcy.
Traditionally, bankruptcy statutes have emphasized a maximal return for
creditors.2 While the new Code preserves and strengthens the rights of
creditors,3 its primary focus is to enable debtors to maintain their in-
* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Judge Roger M.
Whelan, Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia,
in critiquing this article.
1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 28 U.SC.) (hereinafter cited as the Bankruptcy Code]. The Bank-
ruptcy Code is the fifth in a series of bankruptcy laws, the four previous acts being the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1976))
[hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act]; the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517
(1867) (repealed 1879); the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843);
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803). In addition to these
blanket enactments of bankruptcy legislation, the Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840
(repealed 1979), provided for the so-called "chapter proceedings' under the Bankruptcy
Act. See generally Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions.- Critique and Suggestion, 68 YALE L.J.
1459 (1959).
The Code became effective on October 1, 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat.
2549. Matters and proceedings initiated prior to October 1, 1979, are to be dealt with under
the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Bankruptcy Code, supra, at §
403(a). The Code's provisions elevating the bankruptcy courts from their current status as
departments of the United States District Courts to a position adjunct to those courts, exer-
cising the unique "flow-through" jurisdiction described in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(b)-(c) (West
Supp. 1979), will become effective on April 1, 1984. Bankruptcy Code, supra, at § 402(b).
Until that date, the present system of bankruptcy courts will operate with the term of all
sitting judges extended until March 31, 1984, or the date upon which a successor takes office.
Id § 404(a), (b). While the congressional extension of the terms of sitting judges may ap-
pear to infringe upon the separation of powers doctrine, it is clear that no judges are actually
appointed by Congress under this system. Rather, an experimental program in which a
United States Trustee will oversee the administration of cases arising under the Code went
into effect on October 1, 1979. Id § 402(a). A "sunset" clause will terminate the United
States Trustee Program on April 1, 1984, unless the Congress and the President affirmatively
act to continue it. Id § 408(a)-(c).
2. See notes 24-31 infra.
3. As stated in the Report of the House Judiciary Committee, "the Bill codifies credi-
tors' rights more clearly than the case law, which is in many ways just developing. It defines
the protections to which a secured creditor is entitled, and the means through which the
court may grant that protection." HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY BANKRUPTCY LAW
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dependent economic existences after bankruptcy.4
The importance of balancing the policies of maximizing creditors' re-
turns and leaving the debtor as a viable economic entity has long been
recognized in bankruptcy proceedings.' Historically, states have deter-
mined what property may be retained by debtors6 by enacting exemption
statutes to place certain enumerated forms of property beyond the reach of
state execution mechanisms. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act), the imme-
diate predecessor of the Code, explicitly incorporated these state exemp-
tion laws, thereby allowing debtors a minimum residue of property
following their discharge in bankruptcy.7 By this means, bankrupts were
afforded a "fresh start" in the hope that they would not become a burden
upon society after bankruptcy.
As consumer credit expanded in the 1950's, however, the Act became
outmoded.8 Creditors adopted techniques whereby consensual liens9 arose
in a debtor's otherwise exempt property. The creation of security interests
in property vital to the debtor's everyday existence, such as automobiles,
also provided creditors with leverage far in excess of the liquidation value
of the collateral.'" In addition, exemption statutes incorporated in the Act
REvISION, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
4. Id at 126 ("[T]he bill.., enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start.").
5. The "fresh start" doctrine has been well documented in the courts. In Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of bankruptcy
was to give the debtor "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, un-
hampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." Id at 244. The Court
in Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915), emphasized the need
to permit debtors to "start afresh" after bankruptcy. Id at 554-55. Outside of bankruptcy,
exemption statutes have provided protection of debtors' livelihoods since the enactment of
the Statute of Westminster II in 1285 which provided limited relief from creditor process.
See S. REISENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS'
PROTECTIONS 230 (1967).
6. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. I, § 17 (providing that debtors should "enjoy the neces-
sary comforts of life"). See generally 31 AM. JUR. 2d Exemptions §§ 33-119 (1967).
7. The quantity of property left to debtors was subject to local determination in light of
local economic needs. Section 6 of the Act stated in pertinent part: "[Tihis Act shall not
affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by . . .the State
laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition .... ." See also 3 H. REMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY § 1177 (rev. ed. 1957); 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 115, 116 (1971).
8. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 169 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORTS, PART I OR II].
9. Consensual liens are those interests in the property of another by contract. Security
interests under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code fall within this category. Such
liens are to be contrasted to interests in the property of another which are imposed by the
operation of law, such as statutory mechanics' liens.
10. COMMISSION REPORT, PART I, supra note 8, at 169, 173-74.
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varied tremendously from state to state." Many eastern states maintained
statutes from the gaslight era which effectively denied bankrupts any
meaningful protection" while certain southern and western states enacted
statutes remarkable for their liberality.13 This wide variation in the treat-
ment of debtors under the ostensibly uniform bankruptcy laws 4 led to
disparate treatment and opened the way for extensive forum shopping by
debtors. 15
In July of 1970, when these and other deficiencies of the Act came to the
attention of Congress, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States was created16 to "study, analyze, evaluate and recommend
changes. . ." in the Act of 1898.17 During the study period, the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws'" drafted the Uniform Exemptions Act
which was designed for inclusion in the new Bankruptcy Code.' 9 In ac-
cordance with its finding that the Act's incorporation of diverse state stat-
utes frequently led to the "frustration of the debtor's right to enjoy his
exemptions, the Bankruptcy Commission recommended the enactment
of such uniform exemptions to ensure debtors a realistic fresh start after
bankruptcy.
11. See generally Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14
RUTGERS L. REV. 678 (1960); Note, supra note 1.
12. See Countryman, supra note 11, at 681-84 (citing Maryland and Massachusetts ex-
emption laws as examples of parsimony).
13. Id. (describing the extensive exemptions available under Texas law and the high
average exemption claim in Florida proceedings).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 states: "Congress shall have the power... to establish...
un!form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcy throughout the United States" (emphasis ad-
ded). See also notes 43-44 infra.
15. The Bankruptcy Act did not actively prohibit forum shopping. Section 6 provided
that a debtor could avail himself of the exemption laws of any state in which he had been
domiciled for the majority of six months preceding the filing of his petition. See Bankruptcy
Act, supra note 1, § 6.
16. The membership of the Commission included: Harold Marsh, Jr., Esq.; Professor
Charles Seligson; J. Wilson Newman, Esq.; The Honorable Quentin N. Burdick, Senator
from North Dakota; The Honorable Marlow W. Cook, Senator from Kentucky; The Honor-
able Don Edwards and The Honorable Charles E. Wiggins, Representatives from Califor-
nia; The Honorable Edward Weinfeld, United States District Judge, Southern District of
New York; and The Honorable Herbert L. Will, United States District Court Judge, North-
ern District of Illinois. Professor Frank Kennedy served as the staff director for the Com-
mission. COMMISSION REPORT, PART I, supra note 8, at v.
17. Act of July 7, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
18. The Commissioners' draft promulgates and records the enactment of model legisla-
tion concerning topics of state interest.
19. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 145 (1976).
20. COMMISSION REPORT, PART I, supra note 8, at 10.
21. COMMISSION REPORT, PART II, supra note 8, at 125-30. The proposed exemption
19801
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Following a vigorous examination of the Commission's recommenda-
tions and an unusually stormy passage through the houses of Congress,22
the Code emerged with this uniform approach to exemptions substantially
intact.23 This article will examine these exemptions and certain allied sec-
tions of the Code with regard to the impact of the Code on the debtor's
fresh start after bankruptcy.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRESH START DOCTRINE
The concept of granting debtors a "fresh start" following some sort of
discharge of their obligations has been slow to develop. As recently as the
nineteenth century, English debtors unable to meet their obligations were
jailed in so-called "debtor's prisons. '2 4 Although this practice provided
creditors with a certain vicarious return,25 it proved inefficient in two re-
spects. Creditors could not receive returns in excess of the debtor's net
worth at the moment of incarceration, and the state was burdened with the
expense of maintaining the debtor-prisoner and his inevitably destitute de-
pendents. 26  Although various statutes were later enacted to protect the
debtor from imprisonment, these statutes permitted such broad seizures of
property by creditors that the debtor merely joined his family on the public
dole.27 In the United States, the Constitution empowered Congress "to
statute was designed to supplant completely state exemptions in the bankruptcy court. See
UNIFORM EXEMPTION ACT § 4-503(a) [hereinafter cited as U.E.A.]. It included exemptions
of fixed value for homesteads, livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings,
tools of the trade or profession, motor vehicles, burial plots, cash, securities and receivables,
and the cash surrender value of any life insurance policy payable to the debtor. Id §4-
503(b)-(d). Items exempted up to a "reasonably necessary" amount included life insurance
proceeds where the debtor was the spouse or dependent of the insured, income from a retire-
ment, annuity, profit sharing or similar plan, the debtor's health aids, and an allowance for
certain survivors of a deceased debtor. Id § 4-503(c)(5)-(9), (e). The following items were
declared exempted regardless of value: payments of alimony, support or separate mainte-
nance, disability benefits, and proceeds, benefits, or other rights resulting from personal in-
jury or unemployment. Id § 4-503(c)(4), (7), (8).
22. For a detailed account of the tortuous path taken by the Code, see I COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY VI-XXV (15th ed. 1979) (Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Act).
23. See 123 CONG. REC. E21 (Jan. 4, 1977) ("The bill provides a set of exemptions,
based largely on the Uniform Exemptions Act..."). See also COMMISSION REPORT, PART
I, supra note 8, at 10; Note, supra note 1, at 1459.
24. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229-33 (1966). See also I W.
HOLDSWORTH at 600, n.4 (1966).
25. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 24, at 501. Aside from such motives, the power to
imprison for debt was subject to procedural abuses whereby the allegation of a nonexistent
debt was sufficient basis for incarceration. See 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 24, at 596-
97.
26. The cost of maintaining debtors in prison became so burdensome that acts were
passed compelling creditors to make appropriate weekly support payments. Id at 597.
27. In 1702, the Act of Anne, I Anne C. I, c.25 (1702), provided that debtors could be
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establish. . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcy throughout the
United States,",28 without specifying the character of the relief to be made
available. While the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 contained certain uniform
federal exemptions,29 neither it nor the three subsequent Bankruptcy
Acts3° granted bankrupts substantially more than a discharge from prior
liabilities.3 ' The last of these acts and the Code's immediate predecessor,
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, offered bankrupts a discharge coupled with
the retention of any property exempted under the applicable state law.32
In 1938, the Chandler Act33 added the so-called "chapter proceedings" 3
4
to the Bankruptcy Act. These amendments permitted those debtors with
sufficient prospects for future earnings to strike an agreement with their
creditors whereby the debtors would pay off their obligations pursuant to a
plan approved by the court and a majority of their creditors while retain-
ing use and control of their assets.35 Once the scheduled payments were
completed, the debtors were granted a discharge as to any residuum of
indebtedness.36 While the proceedings created by the Chandler Act pre-
vented the seizure of certain debtors' assets, they applied only when the
debtor could convince his creditors that a plan of payments would provide
a higher yield than a straight liquidation under chapter VII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 37 Debtors unable to make such a showing were forced to ac-
released from prison upon stating under oath that they had no estate in excess of 10 pounds.
For debtors under 40 years of age, this release was made conditional upon immediate enlist-
ment in the army or the navy. Id One of the earliest Anglo-American predecessors of the
modem bankruptcy acts was the Statute of King Henry VIII. 34 & 35 Henry 8, c.4 (1543).
See S. REISENFELD, supra note 5, at 387. That statute viewed insolvency as a fraudulent act
and served as a liquidation tool without offering the debtor a discharge. The concept of a
discharge did not arise in England until 1705. 1 F. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANK-
RUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 3, 5 (5th ed. 1950).
28. See note 14 supra.
29. For a competent synopsis of these provisions, see Marier, Exemptions.A Full Circle
Back to the Act of 1800, 53 CORNELL L.Q. 663 (1968).
30. See note 1 supra.
31. In fact, the discharge was not granted to honest debtors as of right until 1898. See
generally Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1.
32. Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, § 6.
33. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1979).
34. The term "chapter proceedings" as applied in the Chandler Act differentiated its
procedurally distinct mechanisms from the pure liquidation provisions contained in chapters
I through VII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See note 37 infra.
35. These revisions were adopted primarily to avoid the wholesale termination of busi-
nesses during the depression years. See Chandler, The Revised Bankruptcy Act of 1938, 24
A.B.A.J. 880, 881 (1938).
36. Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, §§ 476, 660.
37. Liquidation of all but the debtor's exempt property is provided for by chapter VII of
the Bankruptcy Act.
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cept relief under chapter VII and face the loss of all property except that
specifically exempted under the Act.
The Act's incorporation of state exemption laws in chapter VII proceed-
ings caused the treatment of bankrupts to vary widely from state to state.38
In many jurisdictions, particularly in the northeast, exemption laws en-
acted at the turn of the century remained in force. 39 Frequently, these
laws protected property of a sort no longer held by debtors of this area 41
and failed to keep the exemption amounts in step with inflated prices of
the day.4' On the other hand, states such as California and Texas enacted
exemption statutes so liberal as to include costly jewelry and extensive
land holdings.42 Although this patent disparity in state exemptions ap-
peared .to be an unconstitutional lack of national uniformity in the bank-
ruptcy laws, the Supreme Court in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses 43
held that the requirement of "uniformity" was "geographical, and not per-
sonal."'  Thus, only debtors of like residence were entitled to like treat-
ment. This pronouncement was of little comfort to eastern debtors who
lost virtually all of their possessions due to antiquated state exemption
laws.
There were numerous other areas in which the Act provided less than
adequate protection for debtors. During the expansion in consumer credit
over the last thirty years, creditors adopted powerful new techniques to
ensure payment of loans that might otherwise have been commercially un-
sound. One common technique involved taking blanket security interests
in the debtor's household goods and furnishings. 45  Regardless of the
debtor's need for such basic items and their exemption under even the
most draconian state laws,46 these blanket liens were enforceable because
they were consensual agreements. Another common technique of creditors
was to take security interests in a necessary item, such as the debtor's auto-
38. See Countryman, supra note 11, at 680; Note, supra note 1, at 1963-69.
39. For a discussion of these statutes' obsolescence in terms of exempted property and
maximum dollar limits on exemptions, see Countryman, supra note 11, at 682-83.
40. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 15-501(7) (1973) (providing for the exemption of "one horse
or mule; one cart, wagon, or dray and harness..."); VA. CODE § 34-26(5) (1976) (exempt-
ing, inter alia, a spinning wheel, one pair of cards, and fifty bushels of shelled corn).
41. D.C. CODE § 15-501(7) (1973) (exemption of debtor's automobile limited to
$500.00); VA. CODE § 34-26(5) (1976) (two hundred pounds of bacon not to exceed $25.00
and an oysterman's boat and tackle not to exceed $1,500.00).
42. See Countryman, supra note 11, at 682.
43. 186 U.S. 181 (1902) (addressing the incorporation of state exemptions by the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898).
44. Id at 188.
45. COMMISSION REPORT, PART I, supra note 8, at 10; Note, supra note 1, at 1470 n.78.
46. See generally 31 AM. JUR. 2d Exemptions § 125 (1967).
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mobile, and then threaten to deprive the debtor of its use by repossession if
the debtor failed to reaffirm his debt after bankruptcy.47 By taking such
necessary collateral, creditors used security interests to obtain bargaining
power far in excess of the liquidation value of that collateral.48
Courts have not been insensitive to the possibility that such sophisti-
cated collection techniques, coupled with antiquated state exemption laws,
might deny debtors a fresh start under the Act by leaving them with a
discharge and little else. This concern was manifested in a series of cases
construing the language of section 70(a) of the Act, which provided that
the trustee in bankruptcy was vested with title to all "non-exempt prop-
erty" of the bankrupt.49 While it was clear that the title to exempt prop-
erty remained in the bankrupt,5 ° the scope of the term "property"
remained uncertain.
In Lines v. Frederick,5 the Supreme Court held that accrued but unpaid
vacation pay was not within the definition of "property" passing from the
bankrupt to the trustee under section 70(a).52 The Court reasoned that the
term "property" was modified by both the exemption exclusion53 and the
basic policy of the Act to provide the bankrupt with a fresh start "un-
hampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."54 The
Court concluded that accrued vacation pay was so necessary to the bank-
rupt's ability to make a fresh start that its relinquishment to the trustee
would defeat the underlying policy of the Act.55 Although in In re
Cedor,5 6 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended the Lines
exception to tax refunds owing to the bankrupt at the time of filing, Cedor
was later overruled by the Supreme Court in Kokoszka v. Beford.57 The
47. See Note, supra note 1, at 1470 n.78.
48. See COMMISSION REPORT, PART I, supra note 8, at 169.
49. Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, § 70(a). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 117;
Note, supra note 1, at 1469-70.
50. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 299 (1903).
51. 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
52. Id at 20. Section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act provided for title to vest in the
trustee as to certain property, including rights of action.
53. See note 50 supra.
54. 400 U.S. at 19 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934)).
55. 400 U.S. at 20. The analytical framework for this decision was first set out in Segal
v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), where loss carry-back tax refunds were deemed to be
"property" on the basis that tax refunds were "rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past... [and
were minimally]. . . entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make an unencumbered fresh
start . I..." d  at 380. The result in Lines was criticized in a commentary by Judge Lee.
See Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 115 (1971).
56. 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972). For a scathing criticism of this case, see Lee, Leading
Case Commentary, 47 AM. BANKR. L.J. 239 (1973).
57. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
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Court reasoned that "since a tax refund is not the weekly or other periodic
income required by a wage earner for his basic support, to deprive him of
it will not hinder his ability to make afresh start unhampered by the pres-
sure of preexisting debt."'5 8 Therefore, the tax refund is section 70(a)(5)
property which passes to the trustee.
The continual and somewhat artificial debate among courts concerning
the scope of the term "property" has been viewed by some commentators
as an attempt to create a federal common law exemption based directly
upon the Act's fresh start policy.59 The clear implication of these cases is
that the courts recognized that the Act, by its reference to state exemption
laws, was insufficient to guarantee bankrupts such a fresh start. By virtue
of its reference to nonuniform and frequently antiquated state laws, as well
as its failure to guarantee even the limited benefits thereby conferred, the
Act presented debtors with a dilemma: they could refrain from seeking
relief in bankruptcy far beyond the time at which they might realistically
be able to pay their obligations, or they could file in bankruptcy and obtain
a discharge from past liabilities at the cost of losing even those basic items
necessary to carry on a civilized existence. It was against this background
that Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
II. THE DEBTOR'S PROTECTIONS UNDER THE CODE
The new Bankruptcy Code incorporates a number of mechanisms to cre-
ate and preserve a pool of property to be retained by the debtor after bank-
ruptcy. Together, they provide uniform definitions of the debtor's estate,6"
the nature6' and extent62 of his exemptions, and the manner in which
rights to those exemptions are preserved.63 Since these provisions were
drafted as a whole, they form an interlocking network of protections capa-
ble of assuring debtors a fresh start.
A. The Debtor's Estate
The Code's policy of assuring the debtor's fresh start is evident from an
58. 417 U.S. at 648 (quoting opinion below at 479 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1973)) (empha-
sis in original). See Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173 (1975) (ap-
plauding the limitation of the Lines doctrine).
59. Judge Lee voiced this opinion in his analysis of the Lines case. He observed that the
Court has used the definition of "property" as a vehicle to circumvent antiquated state ex-
emption laws and impose a national uniformity on exemptions in bankruptcy. Lee, supra
note 55, at 118-19 (1971).
60. See notes 64-71 and accompanying text infra.
61. See notes 72-80 and accompanying text infra.
62. See notes 81-136 and accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 137-72 and accompanying text infra.
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examination of its provisions regarding the property to be contained in the
debtor's estate. The Code has substantially altered the law as it existed in
this area under the Act. Section 541(a)(1) of the Code provides that upon
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy all interests of the debtor, whether
legal or equitable, shall pass into the debtor's estate.64 Property claimed as
exempt is then returned to the debtor, absent the objection of a party in
interest.65 This language preempts the pre-Code case of Lockwood v. Ex-
change Bank,66 holding that title to exempt property remained in the
bankrupt.67 By placing such a broad interpretation on the debtor's estate,
the Code brings all of the debtor's assets before the court, thereby assum-
ing full responsibility for determining the propriety of all exemptions
claimed by the debtor68 and for providing the debtor with a fresh start.
By bringing substantially all of the debtor's property into the estate and
providing for certain uniform exemptions," the Code also appears to un-
dermine the efficacy of the Lines decision and its progeny. 7° Those deci-
sions were based on the assumption that the bankrupt's fresh start was not
always guaranteed by a literal application of the Act. They sought to se-
cure this benefit by judicially "exempting" certain property from the ad-
ministration of the bankrupt estate through the imposition of seemingly
artificial constructions of the term "property." The Code, however, pro-
vides for the application of minimum federal exemptions to all the debtor's
assets. This indicates a conscious congressional determination of the
proper extent of the fresh start to be granted the debtor. 7' Further efforts
64. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 541(a)(1) provides: "The commencement of a
case . . . creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever
located: (1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." This
broad statement is limited only with respect to special powers of appointment and spend-
thrift trust benefits. Id § 541(b)-(c)(2).
65. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(1) requires the debtor or a dependent to file a
list of exempt property. If no objections to the list are forthcoming from creditors, the prop-
erty claimed will become exempt.
66. 190 U.S. 294 (1903). See text accompanying note 50 supra.
67. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 368.
68. Id The jurisdictional grants to the bankruptcy courts appear to be sufficiently
broad to overrule Lockwood on purely jurisdictional grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 147 l(b)-(c)
(1976).
69. Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth uniform federal exemptions.
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(d). The substance of these exemptions will be ex-
amined at text and accompanying notes 81-136 infra.
70. See notes 50-58 and accompanying text supra.
71. The fact that under § 522(b) the debtor may choose either federal or state exemp-
tions does not undermine this proposition because the fresh start offered under the federal
provisions may be freely chosen by the debtor. A more difficult problem is posed by §
522(b)(1), which provides that individual state exemption statutes may deny debtors access
19801
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to unify the Code's interpretation in the several states were undertaken
regarding the extent to which exempt property is actually free from credi-
tor process.
B. Effect of Exemptions
Traditionally, the state exemption laws invoked under the Act have been
less than an absolute shield for the property exempted. Certain classes of
creditors have been permitted to execute against property, notwithstanding
its exempt status.72 To provide a uniform interpretation of the effect of the
Code exemptions, Congress enacted section 522(c). This section states
that, subject to only four exceptions, exempt property is not subject to exe-
cution on account of any debt arising or deemed to have arisen73 before
the commencement of the case.74
The first exception, contained in section 522(c)(1), states that debts in the
nature of nondischargeable taxes, alimony, maintenance, and support are
collectable from exempt property.75 To the extent that dischargeable tax
obligations arising prior to filing are not specifically excepted, it appears
that, contrary to pre-Code law, they may no longer be collected from ex-
empt assets.76 Section 522(c)(2)(A) provides that prepetition liens not
to the federal provisions. If the states exercise this option, they will render nugatory the
guarantee of a fresh start under § 522(d). It is conceivable that in states exercising this
power, courts' may resort to other analyses as artificial as that used in Lines, where state law
fails to guarantee a fresh start equivalent to that available under federal law. To date, Vir-
ginia, Florida, Ohio, and Louisiana have affirmatively denied debtors recourse to the federal
exemptions. See note 160 infra.
72. See Note, supra note I, at 1146-70.
73. See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 502. Certain subsections of § 502 treat claims
arising after the petition as if they arose prior to that date. Section 502(f) permits claims
arising after the petition in the ordinary course of the debtor's business or financial affairs to
be treated as prepetition claims in order to encourage creditors to deal with debtors in pos-
session in involuntary cases. Sections 502(g) and (h) permit prepetition consideration of
claims arising as a result of the exercise of certain powers of the trustee such as the rejection
of executory contracts and leases or voiding of an improper set-off. Section 502(i) treats the
recapture of an investment tax upon the transfer of property in the estate as a prepetition
claim regardless of when it arose. See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 354-55.
74. Property deemed exempt under § 522(d) is not protected from any postpetition
debts. Creditors holding these obligations will be constrained in execution upon them only
by local exemption statutes.
75. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(c)(1). These qualifications for nondis-
chargeability are set out in detail in § 523(a)(1) and (5) of the Code.
76. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 361; 124 CONG. REC. S17412 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC. HI 1095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Butler). This provision may be changed if, as anticipated, Congress reviews
the exemptions from levy contained in the Internal Revenue Code and increases them to
levels comparable to those in the Code. 124 CONG. REC. S 17430 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); 124
CONG. REC. HI 1113 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
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avoided by the trustee under the provisions of the Code may be satisifed
from exempt property. 7 Section 522(c)(2)(B) perpetuates the pre-Code
rule that liens are valid against exempt property if they are not voided
upon the challenge of an interested party.7" Finally, section 522(c)(2)(C)
provides for the collection of certain avoided tax liens from exempt prop-
erty.
7 9
Section 522(c) ensures that the federally mandated exemptions of the
Code will not be rendered ineffective by state laws permitting a large class
of creditors to execute against exempt property. In addition, because this
section applies regardless of the debtor's choice of state or federal exemp-
tions, it also defines the class of creditors against whom a state's own ex-
emptions are effective.8" Thus, section 522(c) is another step toward a
unified system of exemptions under which the debtor's fresh start may be
guaranteed. At the core of that system are the uniform federal exemptions.
C. The Federal Exemptions
Section 522(d) of the Code contains the substantive provisions of the
new federal exemptions, which are a substantial liberalization of the older
state laws. For purposes of comparison, these exemptions will be discussed
in light of the exemption statutes of Virginia,8" Maryland,82 and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.83 These jurisdictions are of particular interest because
77. The avoidance powers referred to in this section include the so-called "strong arm'
and other powers under § 544, the ability to avoid statutory liens under § 545, the avoidance
of preferences under § 547, the recovery of fraudulent conveyances under § 548, the recovery
of certain postpetition transfers under § 549, and the avoidance of any liability for punitive
or exemplary damages under § 724(a). Such actions may be instituted by the trustee in
bankruptcy or the debtor by filing a complaint and thereby initiating an adversary proceed-
ing. The debtor may wish to forego these remedies and reaffirm a debt where a continuing
relationship with a creditor such as a family doctor is desired.
78. See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 506(d). This section permits liens to survive
and remain effective after bankruptcy unless the claim upon which the lien is based is disal-
lowed upon the challenge of the debtor or other interested party. HoUSE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 357. This rule codifies the holding in Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886), with
respect to the enforcement of liens against exempt property. See also Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 582-83 (1935).
79. This is really an exception to the rule of § 522(c)(2)(A) that liens voided under § 545
may not be satisfied out of exempt property. Here, a tax lien voidable under § 545(2) but
filed in proper form subsequent to the date of filing in bankruptcy appears to be a valid lien
as to the exempt property.
80. Because § 522(c) refers to "property exempted under this section .... " it clearly
includes both the federal and state exemptions made available under § 522(b). See Bank-
ruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(b). This provision is similar to the language of § 522(e) in
the application of the antiwaiver provision. Id § 522(e).
81. VA. CODE § 34 (1976).
82. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-504, 11-505 (1974).
83. D.C. CODE § 15-501 (1973).
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Virginia debtors are foreclosed from enjoying the federal provisions, 84
Maryland offers debtors exemptions that have been criticized as antiquat-
ed,85 and the District of Columbia is a federal compound, presumably re-
flecting some of the concerns and goals of Congress. In addition, they will
be contrasted to the Uniform Exemptions Act (U.E.A.)8 6 from which they
were derived.87
The most expansive provision of the new Code is the $7,500.00 exemp-
tion for the debtor's residence. 88 In the U.E.A., a similar provision al-
lowed for an exemption of up to $10,000.00.89 While neither the District
of Columbia nor Maryland recognizes such a homestead exemption, most
states do provide debtors such protection.9" In Virginia, however, the
$5,000.00 homestead exemption created for the benefit of a householder or
head of a family is substantially lower than the federal exemption. 9'
To complement this provision and grant equivalent treatment to debtors
unable to claim homestead exemptions, section 522(d)(4) provides for an
exemption of property of any kind in the amount of $400.00 plus any un-
used portion of the $7,500.00 allowance in section 522(d)(1). 9 2 Virginia
provides for a similar option but limits it to debtors not claiming under the
homestead exemption.93 While neither Maryland nor the District of Co-
84. VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1979).
85. For a broadside on the Maryland exemption provisions, see Countryman, supra,
note 1i, at 680-84.
86. See note 21, supra.
87. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 361. The House bill, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1978), incorporated the Uniform Exemptions Act almost verbatim. In order to reach
an acceptable compromise with the Senate, the dollar amounts of nearly all the exemptions
were lowered. Id
88. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(d)(1). This exemption applies to any resi-
dence or cooperative interest providing the debtor or his dependents with a residence or
burial plot. Id § 522(a)(1). It extends to realty or personalty, thus including mobile homes
and cooperative share interests. It should also be noted that § 522(m) permits a husband and
wife filing jointly to double the exemptions available to a single debtor under § 522(d) of the
Code.
89. U.E.A. § 4(a).
90. In addition to the District of Columbia and Maryland, only four other states fail to
provide a homestead exemption: Connecticut, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
See Note, supra note 1, at 1469, n.76; Note, The Uniform Exemptions Act and Pennsylvania
Law, 79 U. PiTr. L. REV. 357, 362, n.31 (1977).
91. VA. CODE § 34-4 (Supp. 1978).
92. This is the so-called "cafeteria exemption" which can be used regardless of the na-
ture of the property claimed. The U.E.A. contains a similar, but less potent, version of this
provision in § 8(d). This allows for a $500.00 cafeteria exemption which is raised to
$1,500.00 if the debtor does not claim the homestead exemption in § 4(a).
93. Va. Code, § 34-13 (1976). Note that the equalizing effect of this section is lost be-
cause the dollar amounts were not increased to match those in the amended § 4 of the
Virginia Code. See note 91 supra.
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lumbia has need for such an equalization provision, Maryland does permit
any debtor to exempt $1,000.00 in cash. 94
The exemption for the debtor's automobile, fixed at $1,500.00 by the
U.E.A.,95 has been reduced to $1,200.00 in the Code.96 The District of
Columbia permits the exemption of a motor vehicle in the amount of
$500.00, 9 7 conditioned upon the vehicle's being used primarily in the
debtor's trade or business.98 Virginia law contains no exemption for
automobiles but does permit the exemption of a horse and cart. 99 In some
states, similar language has been construed to include the modem
equivalents of such items."° Maryland has enacted no exemption dealing
with automobiles.
The Code also adopts an exemption for household goods, wearing ap-
parel, appliances, books, animals, crops, and musical instruments held by
the debtor or a dependent primarily for personal, family, or household
use.' This provision is unusual in that it limits each item to a value of
$200.00 but places no limit on the total value of items exempted.'0 2 Mary-
land offers a limited exemption of household property which specifically
enumerates the eligible items.'0 3 The law of Virginia both enumerates the
items exempted and sets a maximum value on certain classes of items.l°4
The District of Columbia also employs a dual approach under which both
94. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 11-504(a)(1)(i) (1974).
95. U.E.A. § 8(c).
96. Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, § 522(d)(2).
97. D.C. CODE § 15-501(7) (1973).
98. This condition is not satisfied when the debtor uses the vehicle for commuting to
and from his place of employment. Id § 15-501(7).
99. VA. CODE § 34-27 (1976).
100. See, e.g., Phillips v. C. Palmo & Sons, 270 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1959) (tractor-trailer
valued at $16,000.00 exempt as if "two horses" and a "wagon"); Patten v. Sturgeon, 214 F.
65 (8th Cir. 1914) (automobile exempt as if a "carriage"). See also McMullan v. Shields, 96
Mont. 191, 29 P.2d 652 (1934). But see In re McEuen, 19 F. Supp. 389 (W.D. Wash. 1948)
(automobile not exempt as if a "wagon"); Northern N.Y. Trust Co. v. Bano, 151 Misc. 684,
237 N.Y.S. 695 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (automobile not exempt as if a "wagon"). See generally
Countryman, supra note 12, at 673; Note, supra note 1, at 1467 n.64.
101. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(d)(5).
102. Id U.E.A. § 8(a) set the single item ceiling at $500.00 but required that such items
be "reasonably held" for the proper use.
103. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 11-505(a) (1974). This section permits ex-
emption of only basic items, including, but not limited to: one stove, one washing machine,
one refrigerator, kitchen utensils, one bed and mattress per family member, and one kitchen
table and chairs.
104. See VA. CODE § 34-26(2) (Supp. 1978) (family library); id § 34-26(4) (wearing ap-
parel and appurtenances); id § 34-26(5) (general household goods and provisions). In addi-
tion, if the debtor is engaged in agriculture, § 34-27 permits the exemption of certain farm
items, not to exceed $1,000.00 in value.
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the classes and the dollar amounts of exempted property are specified.'05
Due to the severe limitations imposed upon household exemptions by
these jurisdictions, debtors will be hard pressed to emerge from a bank-
ruptcy action with sufficient property for day-to-day existence. Under the
Code, however, the ability to exempt household goods is much broader.
Not only is there no ceiling on aggregate value, but the $200.00 limit on
the value of each item refers to the fair market value on the date the peti-
tion is filed rather than the replacement value or the debtor's basis in the
item.' °6 Practically speaking, the fair market value of household items
within this section will rarely exceed $200.00. Thus, the Code provides a
substantial liberalization with respect to the exemption to household
items. 107
The Code also offers expanded exemptions for jewelry. Section
522(d)(4) permits the debtor to exempt up to $500.00 worth of jewelry held
for personal use. While the ceiling amount is $250.00 lower than that
under the U.E.A.,I° 8 there are no comparable exemptions available in any
of the jurisdictions under consideration.
Tools of the debtor's trade and professional books are exempted by the
Code up to an aggregate of $750.00.109 In Maryland, a more liberal provi-
sion allows the exemption of such items without regard to value." 0 In
Virginia, the debtor receives no special exemptions for this type of prop-
erty,"' while in the District of Columbia, tools of the trade are exempt
only up to $200.00 112 and professional equipment is exempt up to an ag-
gregate value of $300.00.' Again, with the exception of Maryland, the
state law appears to offer far less generous exemptions than does the
105. D.C. CODE § 15-501(1) (1973) (wearing apparel to $300.00 per person); id § 15-
501(2) (household furnishings and cooking utensils to $300.00); and id § 15-501(8) (family
library to $400.00).
106. Bankruptcy Code, supra note I, § 522(a)(2) defines "value" for the purposes of that
section as fair market value.
107. While this provision may tempt attorneys to counsel their debtor-clients to acquire
substantial numbers of $199.99 units and other personal items in anticipation of bankruptcy,
it should be kept in mind that credit extended for the purpose of these purchases may well
fall under the terms of § 523(a)(2) of the Code (nondischargeability of credit advanced on
false pretenses).
108. U.E.A. § 8(b).
109. Bankruptcy Act, supra note i, § 522(d)(6). Section 8(c) of the U.E.A. provides a
ceiling figure of $1,000.00.
110. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(a)(3) (Supp. 1977).
111. The Virginia debtor must look to the enumerated household and agricultural ex-
emptions to retain these items. VA. CODE §§ 34-26; 34-27 (1976).
112. D.C. CODE § 15-501(5) (1973). This section also provides for the exemption of
$200.00 worth of stock or materials to aid the debtor's business.
113. Id § 15-501(6).
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Code. "4
In the area of insurance, the Code permits the exemption of unmatured
term life insurance contracts 115 to avoid the possibility that a trustee will
surrender such contracts and thereby deprive the debtor and his family of
the benefits of life insurance." 6 The debtor is also permitted to exempt up
to $4,000.00 worth of the accrued loan value on policies carrying a cash
surrender value. 17 Among the states under examination, only Maryland
offers similar protection for the cash surrender value of insurance poli-
cies.' 18
One unusual provision of the Code is the exemption granted for profes-
sionally prescribed health aids.' While a similar exemption is created
under the U.E.A.,' 2 ° it appears nowhere in the laws of the states in ques-
tion. Considering the rising costs of such items, this section represents a
substantial measure of assistance to ailing debtors.
The final two categories of exemptions provided by the Code can be
characterized as exemptions of benefits akin to future earnings' 2' and
compensation of prior loss. 122 Section 522(d)(10) of the Code exempts so-
cial security, unemployment, and local public assistance benefits without
regard to amount. 123 In addition, that section exempts payments for ali-
mony, support, and separate maintenance, along with annuity and pension
benefits. The latter are exempt only to the extent that they are "reasonably
necessary" for the support of the debtor or a dependent. 124 While the term
"reasonably necessary" is undefined in the Code, other jurisdictions em-
114. This is of particular importance to the Virginia debtor because that state has exer-
cised its option to bar access to the federal exemptions. See note 160 infra.
115. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(d)(7). See U.E.A. § 7. The unique rationale
for this exemption explains why it does not appear in the state exemption laws.
116. The trustee's power to reject an executory contract is found in § 365(a) of the Code.
VA. CODE § 38.1-482 (1976) protects certain group life insurance policy contracts from at-
tacks by creditors.
117. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(d)(8). The maximum exemption set forth by
the U.E.A. was only $1,500.00. U.E.A. § 7. Note that the amount of any automatic pre-
mium loan permitted under § 542(d) to avoid forfeiture of the policy will be deducted from
the $4,000.00 exemption to the debtor. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 361-62.
118. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 385 (1957) provides an exemption for both the loan
value and the benefits of life insurance contracts, regardless of amount.
119. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(d)(9).
120. U.E.A. § 5(2).
121. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(d)(10).
122. Id § 522(d)(11).
123. Id § 522(d)(10)(A), (B) & (C). See generally, U.E.A. § 5(3), (5).
124. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(d)(10)(D), (E). Cf U.E.A. § 5(3) (no dollar
limit on social security, state unemployment compensation, or federal and local public
assistance).
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ploying similar language have placed greater emphasis upon the "reason-
able" component than upon the "necessary." 1 25  In Maryland, certain
disability payments are specifically exempted.1 26 Virginia has a similar
provision 27, while the District of Columbia exempts substantially all un-
employment, disability, public assistance, and teachers' annuity bene-
fits. 128 . The fragmented state exemption laws in this area are, of course,
augmented by nonbankruptcy federal laws which provide for a substantial
group of additional exemptions.
129
In order to preserve compensatory income to the debtor, section
522(d)(1 1) of the Code exempts crime victim reparation, certain wrongful
death awards, life insurance proceeds, payments up to $7,500.00 for per-
sonal injury, and compensation for the loss of earnings of one upon whom
the debtor was dependent. 30 State provisions in this area abound, with
Maryland,"' Virginia, 112 and the District of Columbia13 3 all offering sub-
stantial exemptions in addition to the applicable federal nonbankruptcy
allowances. '34
Beyond the specific allowances in section 522(d), the Code guarantees
equivalent treatment for future debtors by requiring periodic adjustments
of the dollar amounts specified in its text. '5 This review will occur every
six years and has no analogue in the jurisdictions surveyed.
125. See, e.g., Newport Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
See generally 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Creditors'Rights § 17 (1974); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 607 (1970)
(what constitutes "necessary" furniture of debtor).
126. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(a)(2)(i) (1974). This section does not
exempt such property from claims for necessities contracted for after the disability occurs.
127. VA. CODE § 38.1-346 (1976) (exempting accident and' sickness benefits).
128. D.C. CODE § 46-318(b) (1973) (unemployment compensation); id § 35-717 (disabil-
ity insurance); id § 3-215 (public assistance); and id § 31-718 (teachers' annuities).
129. See note 155 infra.
130. The exemptions as to wrongful death awards, life insurance proceeds, and support
loss are all limited to those reasonably necessary to the support of the debtor and his depen-
dents. See generally note 125 and accompanying text supra.
131. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 48A, § 385 (1957) (exempting insurance proceeds); id art.,
26A, § 13 (criminal injury award).
132. VA. CODE § 38.1-482,488, 510 (exempting life insurance benefits from group, indus-
trial and nonprofit insurers) id § 19.2-368.12(a) (Supp. 1977) (exempting crime victims com-
pensation award).
133. D.C. CODE, § 35-718 (1973) (exempting proceeds of group life insurance); id § 30-
213 (exempting life insurance proceeds generally); and id § 16-2703 (exempting wrongful
death awards).
134. See note 155 and accompanying text infra.
135. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 104. This inflation adjustment was derived from
§ 2 of the U.E.A., but Congress deleted the requirement of that section that such adjustment
be based upon the Consumer Price Index. 124 CONG. REC. H 11091 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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From this overview, it is apparent that the exemptions offered by section
522(d) are almost uniformly more generous in kind and amount than the
state provisions examined. It is particularly striking that the laws of the
District of Columbia, with its historically intimate ties to Congress, do not
better reflect the policies of the Code.'3 6 The federal allowances address
the material needs of contemporary debtors far more directly than do their
counterparts in the states examined, thus fulfilling their stated purpose of
providing a fresh start. Adequate exemption standing alone, however,
would be of dubious value in the face of creditors' sophisticated collection
techniques.
D. Protection of the Debtor's Right to Exempt Property
Several new sections appear in the Code with the goal of ensuring that
the debtor will receive the full benefit of the new and carefully crafted
exemptions in section 522(d). One of the most potent of these provisions is
section 522(e), which precludes unsecured creditors from enforcing any
waiver of the rights or exemptions provided in section 522.137 This an-
tiwaiver language applies equally to federal and state exemptions asserted
in bankruptcy because it applies to all exemptions claimed under subsec-
tion (b). 138 Since many states specifically recognize the debtor's right to
waive certain exemption protections, this new section in the Code repre-
sents a substantial change in the law.' 39 In relation to the federal exemp-
tions, this section ensures that those minimum protections are preserved
for the benefit of even imprudent debtors. 4 °
Of nearly equal importance is section 522(f), which permits the debtor to
136. In fact, the principal provisions of the District of Columbia exemption law have not
been revised since their enactment in 1901. See D.C. CODE, § 15-501 (1973) (legislative
history).
137. While secured creditors are excepted from the provisions of § 522(e) and may gener-
ally enforce valid prepetition liens against exempt property under the terms of § 522(c)(2)(A)
& (B), certain specific kinds of exempt property are placed beyond even their extensive reach
by § 522(0. See notes 141-43 and accompanying text infra.
138, Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(b) provides for exemptions under either fed-
eral or state law and thus brings the administration of the state exemptions within the pur-
view of the Code. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 360-62.
139. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-506 (1974) (recognizing waiver
except as to exemptions in § 11-504(a)(1) & (2)); VA. CODE § 34-22 (1976) (recognizing
waiver of all exemptions except the homestead exemption).
140. Since the Code is a federal enactment, provisions such as § 522(f) which affect ex-
tant contractual agreements do not facially violate the "contracts clause" of the United
States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This clause explicitly refers to state action
only. Id See also Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (recognizing
that the federal ability to grant a discharge in bankruptcy is grounded on this reading of the
clause).
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avoid certain rights of creditors in exempt property. By its terms, the
debtor may avoid all judicial liens on exempt property.' 4 1 Perhaps more
significant from a policy standpoint is the provision allowing the debtor to
avoid any nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest in other-
wise exempt household goods, tools of the trade, and health aids.' 2 This
provision neutralizes the increasingly common practice of consumer credi-
tors of taking security interests in items critical to the debtor's maintenance
to secure unrelated advances of credit. Creditors employing this tactic
gain leverage beyond the resale value of the collateral because the con-
sumer debtor may be induced to continue payments to avoid the
threatened repossession of household necessities. 143 The Code discourages
this practice by permitting the debtor to avoid such interests once bank-
ruptcy proceedings have been initiated.
Section 722 complements this provision by supplying a debtor with the
means to redeem exempt or abandoned property subject to a lien securing
a dischargeable consumer debt. By paying the secured creditor the value
of the collateral,'44 a debtor may now remove a purchase money security
interest from necessary property such as an automobile. 45  This redemp-
tion extends to the entire property rather than just to the exempt interest.
Thus, if the debtor's interest in the item is within the allowed exemption,
he may pay the creditor secured by that property the market value of the
property and redeem its full value. This is the case even where the full
value of the property exceeds the amount of the appropriate exemption. 46
141. Bankruptcy Code, supra note I, § 522(0(I).
142. Id. § 522(f)(2). While the categories of property listed conform to the exemptions
provided in § 522(d)(3), (6), (9), the right to avoid such liens is equally effective where state
exemptions are elected, to the extent that exemptions of such property are provided by the
state. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 362.
143. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 127. See also 123 CONG. REC. E21 (daily ed. Jan.
4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
144. While the nature of the redemption payment contemplated by the Code is unde-
fined, it is apparent that state redemption practices will serve as rough templates for both
bench and bar. In accord with such local law, redemption will be viewed as a lump sum
payment to be due within perhaps 30 days of the court's authorizing order, rather than a
series of partial payments amounting to a judicial refinancing of the debtor's obligation.
This will permit minimum interference with the bargain between the parties consistent with
the option of redemption. Interview with Judge Roger M. Whelan, Bankruptcy Judge,
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia (Feb. 6, 1980). See also H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 380-81 (1977).
145. Creditors enjoy secured status under the Code only to the extent of their collateral.
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 506(a). Because the value of the collateral is determined
in light of its proposed disposition, a creditor entitled to repossess and sell collateral is se-
cured only to the fair market value of the collateral. Thus, a debtor must pay the creditor
this amount to remove a security interest in the property.
146. For a description of this process, see HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 381. Note
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This section will allow debtors to enjoy the full extent of their exemptions
while giving creditors the full value of their security.
The remaining section pertaining to exemptions under the Code grants
debtors the right to exempt property recovered by the trustee and to stand
in the trustee's stead to recover such property on his own behalf. Under
section 522(g), a debtor who has tranferred exempt property involuntarily
and without bad faith may claim any such property recovered by the
trustee. 147 Moreover, the debtor may employ this section to recover prop-
erty when execution has previously occurred on a lien otherwise avoidable
under section 522(0(2). 148 Section 522(h) permits the debtor to avoid cer-
tain transfers149 when the trustee fails to exercise his power to do so.'
50
Viewed as a whole, these satellite sections protect the Code's exemption
section from erosion by state laws. By invalidating waivers of these ex-
emptions, permitting avoidance of nonpossessory, nonpurchase money se-
curity interests in household goods, and recognizing the debtor's right to
redeem collateral for its market value, the Code has created a new system
of contract law. While these provisions do not affect the daily nonbank-
ruptcy transactions of debtors and creditors, they operate to protect the
debtor's fresh start once bankruptcy occurs. Since they apply regardless of
whether the debtor chooses state or federal exemptions, these protections
apply in all straight liquidating bankruptcies. As a result, credit practices
that had frequently overburdened debtors under the Act are now effec-
tively controlled. The new choice-of-exemptions provision does, however,
raise basic questions concerning the underlying policies of the Code.
E Choice of Exemptions
Recourse to the federal exemptions previously described is only one al-
ternative available to the debtor. While section 6 of the old Act limited the
that the exemption ceilings used in the example ($1,500) are higher than those ultimately
enacted in § 522(d)(2) ($1,200).
147. The trustee's powers to which the section refers are contained in the following sec-
tions: Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 510(c)(2) (lien for subordinated claim); id § 542
(property of the estate); id. § 543 (turnover of property or the proceeds thereof held by a
custodian); id § 551 (the panoply of powers contained in §§ 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549,
724(a)); id § 551 (preservation of transfer for the benefit of the estate); and id § 553 (set-off).
148. This provision is significant in order to protect the debtor's rights under § 522(f)(2)
where attachment precedes the invocation of the stay under § 362(a). Id. §§ 522(0)(2) and
362(a).
149. For a brief summary of the powers to which this section gives the debtor access, see
note 77 supra. Also included here is the right to avoid an improper set-off in § 553.
150. The legislative history of this section makes it clear that the debtor is granted only
the right the trustee could have exercised and not an opportunity to challenge a transaction a
second time. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 362-63.
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debtor's exemptions to those state provisions available under bankruptcy
law, 5 ' section 522(b) of the Code permits the debtor to choose between
the state' 52 and the newly enacted federal exemptions. 153 Specifically, the
debtor's choice lies between the federal provisions contained in section
522(d) of the Code and the exemptions of the state in which the debtor was
a domiciliary for 91 of the 180 days preceding bankruptcy. 54 Moreover, a
debtor choosing to exercise his state exemptions is also granted the benefit
of all nonbankruptcy federal exemption statutes.' 55 While these provi-
sions are not available to a debtor claiming under federal exemptions, the
benefits of these acts are substantially incorporated in section 522(d).' 56
Regardless of which set of exemptions a debtor selects, it appears from the
legislative history of the Code that the doctrine of In re White,'5 7 allowing
a debtor to convert nonexempt property into exempt property prior to the
filing of the petition, will be honored.' 58
While the Code provides the debtor with a choice of exemption laws, it
also empowers the state to deny access to federal provisions. Section
522(b)(1) permits the invocation of federal exemptions except where "the
151. See note 32 supra.
152. Where the Act permitted a bankrupt to claim the exemptions of the state in which
he was a domiciliary for the majority of the six months immediately preceding bankruptcy,
the Code substitutes a 180-day period in the interest of more accurate computation of the
period.
153. See notes 81-136 and accompanying text supra. The original House bill, H.R. 8200,
included this "choice of law" provision, while the Senate bill, S. 2266, permitted only the use
of state exemptions. The U.E.A. permitted the more limited choice between Act exemptions
and state constitutional exemptions. U.E.A. § 19.
154. See note 152 supra.
155. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 522(b)(2)(A). The nonbankruptcy federal exemp-
tions include the following: Civil Service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. §§ 729, 2265 (1976);
Foreign Service Act retirement and disability payments, 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976); Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act death and disability payments, 33
U.S.C. § 916 (1976); special pensions to recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38
U.S.C. § 3101 (1976); Social Security payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976); injury or compensa-
tion payments from war risk or hazards, 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (1976); federal homestead lands as
to debts arising prior to the issuance of the patent, 43 U.S.C. § 175 (1976); Railroad Retire-
ment Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. § 228(1) (1976); veteran's benefits, 45 U.S.C. §
352(e); wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). See generall,
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 360.
156. The substantive federal exemption provisions of § 522(d) cover, in broader terms,
the retirement, injury, and disability assets protected under the federal nonbankruptcy ex-
emptions. If anything, because of their greater scope, the provisions of § 522(d) are more
comprehensive than their counterparts.
157. 221 F. Supp. 64, 67 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (bankrupt may convert existing nonexempt
property to exempt property prior to filing).
158. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 361. The historical limitation on this privilege
denying a debtor the right to acquire exempt property by applying for fresh credit appears to
be viable under the Code as well. See 221 F. Supp. at 67.
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[s]tate law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this
subsection specifically does not so authorize."' 5 9 Thus, where a state in-
corporates an explicit disavowal of the federal exemptions into its exemp-
tion statute, the federal provisions will become unavailable to debtors of
that state. To date, Virginia, Florida, Ohio, and Louisiana have enacted
such statutes.'16  The inclusion of this "opt-out" provision resulted from a
series of compromise amendments drafted in an attempt to produce a bill
satisfactory to both houses of Congress.' 6 ' While the legislative history is
silent on this point, it appears that the provision was an attempt by the
Senate to preserve a measure of autonomy to the states in the matter of
debtor-creditor relations. 1
62
Even where both are available, the choice between the federal and state
exemptions requires a more complex analysis than merely comparing the
dollar values offered by the statutes. Section 522(b)(2)(B) permits a debtor
claiming state exemptions to employ any state laws exempting property
held by a tenant by the entirety from execution by a creditor of only one
spouse. On the other hand, election of the federal exemptions triggers
section 363(h) which permits the sale of such property to satisfy the debts
of either spouse.163 Section 363(h) states that the interest of a co-owner of
the debtor's property may be sold along with that of the debtor in cases
where the following four conditions are met:' 64 where partition in kind
would be impracticable;' 65 where the sale of the debtor's undivided inter-
est would realize significantly less than the sale of the property as a
159. Later amendments to the Code changed the language of this section to read "[the
applicable state law] specifically prohibits application of such subsection (d)." S. 658, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1979).
160. 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 79-363 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 222.20); 15 LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3881(B) (1979); 1979 Ohio Laws, File 116 (to be codified at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2329.662 (Page)); VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1979). Numerous states currently
have similar legislation under consideration.
161. 124 CONG. REC. H11095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17412 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
162. Professor Kennedy argues forcefully against federal disruption of state exemption
policies on the ground that only the states are capable of striking a debtor-creditor balance
reflective of local economic needs. See Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy,
45 IOWA L. REV. 445, 449-53, 485-86 (1960).
163. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 363(i) grants the debtor's spouse or co-owner the
right of first refusal once a sale price has been fixed. Section 3630) provides for the return of
proceeds of the sale to the debtor's spouse or co-owner proportionate to that party's interest
in the property. Id § 3630).
164. The power of the trustee to sell the debtor's interest in property is provided in §
363(b) & (c).
165. Id. § 363(h)(1). See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 346.
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whole;' 6 6 where the benefit to creditors outweighs the detriment to the co-
owner; 167 and where the property is not used in the operation of any util-
ity.16 8 Thus, assuming the existence of these conditions, a debtor filing
under the federal exemptions would be subject to the sale of any property
held as a tenant by the entirety and the loss of his interest therein.
From a planning standpoint, this section gives rise to two concerns.
First, where a debtor contemplating bankruptcy has substantial equity in
jointly held property, 169 it may be more advantageous to opt for the less
liberal state exemptions in order to protect such interests under existing
state law. Second, where the jointly owned property is of a type that
would be irreplaceable by the debtor, its preservation may be of para-
mount importance. Where the property is a family residence, for example,
the debtor may choose the protection of the state laws rather than the more
liberal federal provisions that might require the liquidation of the home. ' 71
The "opt-out" provision of section 522(b)(1), on the other hand, raises
serious theoretical and policy questions concerning the basic goals embod-
ied in the Code. While the other mechanisms created by section 522 seem
to have the uniform aim of imposing a systematic law of exemptions
within bankruptcy proceedings, '7 ' section 522(b)(1) permits states to avoid
entirely the liberalized federal exemptions in favor of their own adequate
or inadequate provisions. This option was clearly the product of a political
compromise between the houses of Congress on the issue of a state's right
to determine the nature of debtor-creditor relationships within its borders.
166. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 363(h)(2). See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 346.
167. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 363(h)(3). See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 346.
168. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 363(h)(4). This condition was intended to protect
public utility facilities, which are commonly held jointly by several utility companies, from
being sold upon the bankruptcy of one joint owner. The addition of this provision to the
original House bill represents a compromise in favor of the Senate. See HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 557. 124 CONG. REC. S17409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); 124 CONG. REC.
HI 1093 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
169. That the debtor's equity is a measure of the value of his exemptions is clear from the
Code's legislative history. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 360-61.
170. Inventive counsel would be well-advised to resist the temptation to manipulate the
time of filing of husband and wife claims in order to preserve tenancy by the entirety prop-
erty under the state law option of § 522(b). In Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.
1962), the court affirmed the reopening and consolidation of the cases where the spouses
shared an identity of assets, there was a short time between the filing of the spouses, and the
parties intended to commit a "legal fraud." Id at 355. The court, however, stated that
caution should be used in reopening such cases, lest the purpose of the Bankruptcy provi-
sions be frustrated. Id
171. See notes 60-150 supra.
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In support of its inclusion, it may be noted that respected commentators on
the bankruptcy laws have urged that exemption policy be left for local
determination in light of local economic needs.' 72 On the other hand, the
''opt-out" provision appears to retreat from the total commitment to the
preservation of the debtor's fresh start manifested by the rest of the Code.
The degree to which this option conflicts with the basic policies of the
Code is, however, unclear. If Congress enacted section 522(d) merely for
the purpose of releasing debtors from reliance on antiquated state statutes,
the option and Code policies are in total harmony. By requiring states
affirmatively to deny debtors access to the federal exemptions, the Con-
gress has ensured that states exercising the option will reexamine their own
exemption statutes and make a conscious choice between the two provi-
sions. If the only goal of the Code were to alleviate the hardship suffered
by debtors solely because of local legislative neglect in maintaining and
reviewing state exemption laws, the "opt-out" provision is a success.
If, in the alternative, the Code were intended to go beyond this limited
goal, it is clear that the "opt-out" provision detracts from its policy objec-
tives. By granting states the opportunity to maintain their antiquated ex-
emption statutes, the option undeniably reduces, in some measure, the
amount of property that certain debtors will retain following bankruptcy.
Beyond this observation, however, it is apparent that the major protections
of section 522 will still operate to the debtor's benefit regardless of the
state's position on the quantum of property to be exempt. Waiver of ex-
emptions, however meager, will be ineffective in bankruptcy. Blanket liens
on household goods and furnishings will be avoidable. The debtor will be
permitted to redeem exempt property subject to a purchase money security
interest for the fair market value of the collateral.
It might be argued that these protections are ineffective when applied in
conjunction with a state's parsimonious exemption statute. Of what bene-
fit is it to protect exempt property when that property consists of no more
than a few beds and chairs? While this criticism is valid to an extent, it
fails to account for the more subtle attacks upon a debtors's interest that
the Code was intended to remedy. Notwithstanding the value of a debtor's
exempt household furnishings, if a creditor may impose a blanket nonpur-
chase money security interest upon those items, pressure may be brought
to bear upon the debtor to reaffirm other debts against his better interest.
Section 522(0(2) puts an end to this practice by permitting the debtor to
avoid such liens. Furthermore, regardless of the value of a debtor's car
and other personalty, a creditor holding a purchase money security interest
172. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 162.
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in that property may gain increased leverage in negotiations with the
debtor by threatening to repossess the property. Section 722 limits the
creditor's interest in the collateral to its fair market value. Thus, these
protective provisions operate to protect debtors from overbearing and un-
conscionable contract provisions regardless of the exemption law applied.
The "opt-out" provision is, therefore, only a limited blow to the concept
of the debtor's fresh start under the Code. While it removes one source of
protection, it leaves unaffected the Code's prohibition of certain pervasive
and unsound creditor practices.
III. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 creates an updated exemption law
uniformly applicable to the states. That law grants two separate classes of
protection of a debtor's right to a fresh start after bankruptcy. The federal
exemptions themselves serve to grant a uniform and contemporary formu-
lation of the quantum arid nature of property to be retained by the debtor.
The protective provisions free the debtor from the effects of certain credi-
tor practices which limit or totally deny him the protection of the Bank-
ruptcy Court. With concurrent application of these protections, the Code
will effectively guarantee a fresh start for all honest debtors.
Concern over the "opt-out" provision's effect upon this scheme may be
overstated. While it does permit states to offer substantially less generous
exemptions than are available under the Code, it does not alter the
debtor's ability to neutralize overburdensome creditor interests in prop-
erty. It may be observed that Congress granted the states a right to choose
as to an issue of lesser importance while absolutely imposing a standard of
creditor conduct more central to the proper operation of the Code. In to-
tal, it appears that the Code is successful in addressing the issue of the
debtor's right to a fresh start and is admirable in the subtlety with which
that goal is achieved.
Richard S Davis
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